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Abstract
DIFT (Dynamic Information Flow Tracking) has been a hot topic for more than a
decade. Unfortunately, existing hardware DIFT approaches have not been widely used
neither by research community nor by hardware vendors. It is due to two major reasons:
current hardware DIFT solutions lack support for multi-threaded applications and imple-
mentations for hardcore processors. This work addresses both issues by introducing an
approach with some unique features: DIFT for multi-threaded software, virtual memory
protection (rather than physical memory as in related works) and Linux kernel support
using an information flow monitor called RFBlare. These goals are accomplished by tak-
ing advantage of a notable feature of ARM CoreSight components (context ID) combined
with a custom DIFT coprocessor and RFBlare. The communication time overhead, major
source of slowdown in total DIFT time overhead, is divided by a factor 3.8 compared to
existing solutions with similar software constraints as in this work. The area overhead of
this work is lower than 1% and power overhead is 16.2% on a middle-class Xilinx Zynq
SoC.
1 Introduction
IFT (Information Flow Tracking) consists of adding tags to information containers, propagat-
ing and checking these tags during program execution. A tag is a value associated with the
information container and represents a level of security. For instance, if only two tag values are
considered, the tags can represent private or public information (a tag with N bits can represent
2N security levels). When containers are processed in a program, tags must be updated: this
step is known as tags computation. IFT can be used to detect or prevent software attacks such
as buffer overflows, SQL injection or confidential data leakage [1]. There are two types of IFT:
• SIFT (Static IFT ) consists of an off-line analysis of the binary to check that all branches
of the program are trustworthy.
• DIFT (Dynamic IFT is performed at runtime: it monitors data flow of the program to
make sure that no unauthorized operation is done in the current execution branch.
SIFT is an appealing solution since it does not introduce any runtime overhead and ensure
that the program is safe before executing it. However, this approach is not suited to protect a
whole system consisting of different complex applications developed using different languages.
DIFT is a more practical and flexible solution that can take into account some information
that is hard to predict before execution, such as dynamic memory allocation, data or code
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that depends on the program inputs, etc. In this article, we propose a hybrid approach. The
DIFT monitor described in this work relies on annotations that were statically pre-computed
at compile time.
First, DIFT has been implemented in software but the performance overhead of such solu-
tions is their main drawback (the application runs 37 times slower than without DIFT [1]). In
the last decade, multiple architectures taking advantage of FPGAs have been proposed to re-
duce this performance overhead. This improvement comes at the expense of flexibility provided
by software IFT. Moreover, there is currently no solution provided by CPU hardware vendors
(for instance, ARM and Intel) that allows implementing DIFT. Solutions like ARM TrustZone
or Intel SGX allow protecting memory regions and provide security features for trusted appli-
cations. However, no security guarantees are provided if applications are untrusted, which is
the case in this work.
On the one hand, most of related works implement DIFT on softcores [1, 2, 3, 4] allowing to
test the approach quickly. But most of these architectures are not directly portable to hardcore
CPUs. DIFT requires information at runtime, such as the current executed instruction or
accessed memory addresses, which can be easily recovered from softcore CPUs through existing
signals.
On the other hand, other works such as[5] rely on ARM-based SoCs which do not export
enough information from the CPU. The common way of recovering information for DIFT on a
hardcore CPU is through instrumentation. Instructions are added in the program in order to
recover information that is used to compute and check tags. However, the performance over-
head due to instrumentation is high: it can represent up to 90% of the total DIFT overhead [3].
Furthermore, the solution proposed in [3] is still based on a softcore CPU which is not the final
target of this work.
Debug components can also be used to retrieve such information [5]. Depending on the type
of debug components, the program may still need instrumentation to recover missing informa-
tion. ARM CPUs include two debug components: ETM and PTM. If an ETM (Embedded
Trace Macrocell) [6] with data trace component is included on the device, there is no need
to instrument the code. The ETM sends an information for each CPU instruction executed.
However, CPU that target performance-intensive systems using rich OS (Operating System),
such as Cortex-A cores, use the PTM (Program Trace Macrocell [5]). This debug component,
considered in this work, only sends information about branch or jump addresses. This solution
requires to statically analyze and instrument the program to recover missing information in the
PTM trace [5].
This work targets ARM hardcore CPUs running a Linux kernel. An MMU (Memory Man-
agement Unit) takes care of translating virtual addresses to physical addresses when executing
applications. Existing works associate a tag to the physical address. However, Linux appli-
cations contain virtual addresses. To resolve the difference in these address spaces, related
work [7] uses a lookup table to keep track of translations done by the kernel. In this work,
we propose a novel solution to tag virtual memory instead of physical memory. It provides
the advantage of avoiding recovery overhead of virtual to physical address translations. Exist-
ing hardware-assisted DIFT solutions lack Linux kernel support. Most solutions do not target
modern operating systems. Works considering Linux OS lack the information on how to ini-
tialize the tag of information containers and other kernel modifications. This is very important
because if the initialization is not done correctly, DIFT will fail in detecting attacks. Therefore,
all the kernel modifications we propose are explained in this article, especially the communica-
tion between kernel and DIFT coprocessor.
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Existing works target single-core CPUs. However, most of current CPUs are multi-core, even
in embedded systems. As a consequence, the approach developed in this work is compatible
with multi-threaded applications. To the best of our knowledge, no existing hardware approach
implements DIFT for multi-threaded applications. This paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides insights on existing hardware DIFT solutions. Section 3 presents the proposed
architecture and provides implementation details. Section 4 provides two case studies. Section
5 details implementation results and Section 6 gives some conclusions and future perspectives.
2 Related work and assumptions
Hardware-assisted DIFT has been a hot topic for the last decade. Important works have been
done to implement efficient DIFT on FPGAs. There are four main types of hardware DIFT
approaches proposed in the literature [5]:
• Filtering hardware accelerators [8, 9]. Instead of computing tags for each executed
CPU instruction, this approach proposes to eliminate unmonitored events before com-
puting and checking tags to lower DIFT time overhead.
• In-core approach [1, 4] modifies the architecture of the CPU to compute tags in parallel
to regular operations.
• Off-loading approach [10] takes advantage of multi-core systems to offload tag compu-
tation on another general purpose core.
• Off-core approach [2, 5] consists of using a custom DIFT coprocessor to compute tags.
The idea is similar to the offloading solution but instead of wasting a general purpose
core, this approach uses a custom DIFT coprocessor.
Among the above solutions, only offloading and off-core DIFT approaches are portable
to hardcores. The in-core solution modifies the hardware architecture and therefore is not
feasible in practice. The offloading approach wastes a general purpose core for DIFT operations.
Therefore, the off-core approach is the best candidate to implement DIFT for a hardcore.
Table 1: Comparison with previous off-core approaches
Approaches Target CPU
Multi-threaded
support
Tagged memory Kernel support Tag bits Tag scheme
Floating-point
support
Kannan et al. [2]
Leon3
(softcore)
no physical partial 4 extended memory no
Deng et al. [11], [12]
Leon3
(softcore)
no physical no 1-32 tag TLB no
Heo et al. [3]
Leon3
(softcore)
no physical no 1
packed array
(bitmap)
no
Lee et al. [7]
Leon3
(softcore)
no physical partial 1
packed array
(bitmap)
no
Wahab et al. [5] ARM Cortex-A9 no N/A no 1-32 address and tag no
This work ARM Cortex-A9 yes virtual yes 1-32 TMMU yes
Table 1 provides a comparison of this work with previous off-core approaches that use a ded-
icated co-processor to monitor the applications executed on the main CPU. Implementations for
off-core approaches are generally done using softcores (e.g. Leon3 or SPARC V8 architecture)
as the main CPU. In such solutions, the design is not easily portable on hardcores. Moreover,
some designs do not target modern OS such as Linux. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome
these limitations to implement DIFT.
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This work is an improvement of [5] which proposes to use ARM CoreSight debug compo-
nents, static analysis, and instrumentation to recover required information for DIFT on ARM
SoCs. However, the solution proposed in [5] has several limitations. The coprocessor is imple-
mented using a MicroBlaze softcore which limits its performance because the softcore needs
to fetch instructions from memory, decode the instruction in software and then compute tags.
Furthermore, it lacks kernel support, tagging of floating point and multi-threaded applications
cannot be used.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• Flexible security policies implementation in hardware: previous off-core solutions lack
ways of specifying security policies (compile-time only or runtime only) and do not offer
support for multiple security policies of different tag granularities (page, word, etc.).
• This work proposes to tag virtual addresses instead of physical addresses as done in
related works. It offers the possibility to use the proposed approach with modern OS and
hardcore CPUs with memory management units.
• This work is compatible with multi-threaded applications mainly thanks to the context
ID information obtained from CoreSight PTM. It allows filtering trace using Context ID
and to determine the exact order of operations on the CPU for each thread.
• This work explains how the Linux kernel communicates with the FPGA fabric available
in a Zynq device (including a dual-core Cortex-A9 and reconfigurable logic): information
missing in most, if not all, existing works. It shows how each information container is
tagged and how the kernel synchronizes with the DIFT coprocessor.
• This work tracks all information flows unlike most existing works. It allows detecting a
wider range of attacks, when compared to [5], including attacks targeting library code.
Furthermore, the communication time overhead is improved by a factor 3.8 compared to
existing work strategy, described in [3], with similar software and hardware constraints.
3 Proposed architecture
3.1 Overall architecture
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the proposed approach. The architecture is inspired
from an existing off-core approach [5]. Instead of using a Microblaze as DIFT coprocessor as in
[5], this work takes advantage of a custom DIFT coprocessor. Other main differences are flex-
ible security policies implementation, virtual memory tagging and support for multi-threaded
software.
This paragraph briefly explains how IFT operations are managed by the overall architecture.
To begin with, the application is compiled using a custom embedded Linux distribution and
SDK (Software Development Kit) generated using Yocto toolchain [13]. The modified compiler
instruments the application binary to add str instructions as explained in Figure 4. During
compilation, static analysis is done in order to generate annotations shown in Table 2. When
the user launches the application, the Linux kernel loads application sections (e.g. .text
section) in memory and annotations in tag annotations memory section. The kernel configures
the CoreSight PTM to trace the entire .text section of the application. The trace comes out
via the EMIO (Extended Multiplexed Input/output) interface in PFT (Program Flow Trace)
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protocol as described in [14]. The PFT decoder decodes the trace and stores it in the decoded
trace memory.
DIFT 
Coprocessor
Decoded
trace
memory
Tag annotations
(64 MB)
Tag memory
(64 MB)
ARM 
Cortex-A9
PFT 
decoder
trace
Interrupt
CPU memory 
(384 MB)
TMMU
AXI
Developed Adapted Reused
DDR
AXI 
Master
Custom interface
AXI
interconnect
Instrumentation
RFBlare 
PS2PL
RFBlare 
PL2PS
Process 
mappings
Figure 1: Overall system design with a DIFT coprocessor
The decoded trace only contains information on starting address of basic blocks. What
information flows happen inside a basic block needs to be determined. Static analysis allows to
recover information flows for each basic block in the application and store them in tag annota-
tions section of memory in a similar way as described in [5]. However, some information, such
as load/store addresses, cannot be resolved statically. This missing information is obtained
through instrumentation via Instrumentation IP (Figure 1). The DIFT coprocessor requires
information from other modules such as process mappings IP which is explained in sections 3.4
and 3.7.3. RFBlare IPs, described in section 3.7.2, are used to communicate with the Linux
kernel in order to get the tag of memory address or to set the tag of memory address. The
DIFT coprocessor is responsible for managing these IPs, computing and storing tags in tag
memory section.
3.2 Flexible security policies using DIFT coprocessor
The DIFT coprocessor has been designed in order to provide maximum flexibility in terms of
security policy specification. The security policy specifies how to propagate and check tags in
order to detect a particular kind of attack [15]. There are two missing aspects in existing works
regarding security policies: flexibility to specify security policies and tag granularities.
Security policies can be specified at compile-time or at runtime. The compile-time so-
lution [3] consists of hard-coding the propagation and checking operations using dedicated
opcodes, during the compilation of the application. For instance, consider that the security
policy states that all arithmetic and logic instructions on ARM core result in the logical OR
operation on their corresponding tags. Then, during static analysis, for all arithmetic and
logical instructions of the program code, an OR operation is hard-coded to compute the tags
of their operands. The runtime solution [1] requires a special register called TPR (Tag Prop-
agation Register) to specify the operation that has to be done on tag values. This time, the
static analysis gives the operands for each instruction and the class of ARM instruction: Arith-
metic/logical, Load/Store, Branch, Floating point Load/Store. Thanks to class information,
the DIFT coprocessor can determine with the help of the TPR register, the operation that
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needs to be done to propagate the tags corresponding to the instruction executed on the main
CPU. The main advantage is that the TPR value can be modified at runtime to modify the
policy without recompiling the application.
No existing works provide the flexibility to specify security policies using both methods.
This work proposes an architecture that can implement either one of these approaches pro-
viding developers more flexibility to implement security policies. The DIFT coprocessor ISA
(Instruction-Set Architecture) has two different types of instructions: specific instructions for
compile-time method and specific instructions for runtime method. The last ones are used in
combination with TPR and TCR (Tag Check Register) [1] to implement a runtime security
policy. Table 2 sums up different types of instructions (called annotations) supported by the
custom DIFT coprocessor described in this work. There are four annotation types: Tag initial-
ization, Tag ALU, Tag Load/Store and compound annotations. The same set of annotations
is also included for the floating-point code. Tag initialization annotations can be used in both
runtime and compile-time methods to initialize tags of registers or memory addresses. Tag
ALU annotations propagate tags for registers. For instance, TagRRR annotation (on the fourth
row of Table 2) shows a runtime annotation that contains type field and operands T1, T2,
and T3. The operation op for this annotation will be determined, at runtime, by reading TPR
register value for the corresponding type. If the type field is arithmetic and the TPR register
states that an AND operation must be done on source operands to compute destination tag,
then the operation done on TMC (Tag Management Core) unit of DIFT coprocessor is T1 =
T2 AND T3.
Table 2: Overview of DIFT coprocessor (TMC) instructions (called annotations)
Instruction type Opcode Operation type Example annotation Action
Tag initialization
TagRImm irrelevant TagRImm T1,#1000 T1 = 1000
TagRR irrelevant TagRR T2,T1 T2 = T1
TagMR irrelevant TagMR R1,T1 Mem[R1] = T1
Tag ALU
TagRRR runtime TRR type T1,T2,T3 T1 = T2 op T3
TagRRR2 compile-time TagRRR2 AND T1,T2,T3 T1 = T2 AND T3
Tag Load/Store
TagMTR runtime TagMTR type R1,T1,#4 Mem [R1+4] = T1
TagTRM runtime TagTRM type T1,R1,#4 T1 = Mem[R1+4]
TagMTR2 compile-time TagMTR2 R1,T1,#4 Mem[R1+4] = T1
TagTRM2 compile-time TagTRM2 T1,R1,#4 T1 = Mem[R1+4]
Compound
TagITR runtime TagITR T3,T1,#4 Mem[TMMU(Instrumentation)] = T3
TagTRI runtime TagTRI T4,T2,#4 T4 = Mem[TMMU(Instrumentation)]
TagITR2 compile-time TagITR2 T12,#4 Mem[TMMU(Instrumentation + 4)]
= T1
TagTRI2 compile-time TagTRI2 T2,#4 T2 = Mem[TMMU(Instrumentation
+ 4)]
TagKTR compile-time TagKTR T1 Mem[RFblare PL2PS] = T1
TagTRK compile-time TagTRK T2 T2 = TMMU(Mem[RFblare PS2PL])
Furthermore, existing off-core approaches do not provide different tag sizes and use a fixed
tag size of one bit in most cases. Therefore, security policies that require multiple bits for a
tag (such as heap overflow detection [15]) cannot be implemented. This work offers hardware
support for a tag size up to 32 bits. In addition, it can support multiple security policies as
discussed in Section 4.
3.3 Tag virtual memory
In related works, tags are associated with physical memory addresses. However, Linux applica-
tions are compiled to use virtual addresses and the MMU is responsible to translate them into
physical addresses during execution. Existing solutions consider that it is possible to recover
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translation information from the MMU. This assumption is only realistic if the main CPU is
a softcore tightly coupled with the DIFT co-processor. On a hardcore, a solution could be to
modify the Linux kernel in order to send to the coprocessor information about PTEs (Page
Table Entries), which are managed by the kernel. However, this can be costly because each
time a translation is done, the virtual and physical page numbers need to be sent to the FPGA
part as well. This information can be difficult to obtain from the kernel and needs lots of minor
modifications to the kernel source code which is constantly changing. In addition, the trace
generated by the PTM contains virtual addresses. Therefore, to limit the kernel modifications
and to avoid virtual to physical address translation overhead, a tag is associated to a virtual
address rather than a physical address.
3.4 Tag memory management
We rely on a TMMU (Tag Memory Management Unit) to associate tags to a memory region
used by the main CPU. The TMMU, see Figure 1) is functionally similar to an MMU used
in CPUs. It translates each process virtual address to a physical tag address i.e. the physical
address which contains the tag associated to the virtual address. It is implemented as an
associative array of 64 entries with some additional logic. Each entry contains a virtual page
number and the corresponding physical page number where the tag is located. In order to
initialize the TMMU, the mappings of different segments of the process (e.g. code and data)
are sent to the FPGA (Process mappings IP in Figure 1). This information is retrieved while
the application is being loaded by the kernel and is sent to the FPGA part via process mappings
IP (Figure 1). The process mappings IP contain 64 registers to store information for virtual
address page numbers.
3.5 Coprocessor design
Figure 2 illustrates the high-level architecture of the DIFT coprocessor. The coprocessor has
two main submodules: the dispatcher and the TMC unit.
1 2
DIFT Coprocessor
3
Dispatcher
Tag Management Core
(TMC)
Annotations
memory
Tag
memory
TagRR T1,T2
BRAM DDR
Tag
annotations
DDR
Decoded 
trace 
memory
BRAM
Figure 2: Coprocessor architecture
The dispatcher initializes and manages all IPs. Its main objective is to find annotations
in program execution order (thanks to decoded trace) and to store them in local annotations
memory for the TMC unit. The dispatcher is implemented as a classical five stages pipelined
MIPS CPU (Figure 3) that allows executing general operations. It reads decoded trace (1), finds
annotations corresponding to the decoded trace by reading tag annotations memory section (2)
and stores them in local annotation memory (3).
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Figure 3: DIFT coprocessor microarchitecture
The Figure 3 shows the internal architecture of the DIFT coprocessor. The TMC core is in
charge of propagating and checking tags according to a security policy. The TMC core contains
3 register files: TRF, TRF FP, and GRF. TRF contains tags corresponding to the main ARM
core registers (r0 to r15) while TRF FP contains tags for the ARM floating point registers
(s0 to s31). GRF contains general purpose registers. If a compile-time security policy is being
implemented, the tag check operation is performed by Tag ALU. Otherwise, at runtime, the
tag check module is responsible for checking tags at the writeback stage. If a tag check fails,
then an interrupt is sent to the ARM core to trigger a counter-measure (e.g. stopping the
application).
The DIFT coprocessor managed two different types of data values: tag values, stored in
TRF (Tag Register File) and general values, stored in GRF (General Register File). TRF is
required in order to store tags of ARM CPU registers and GRF is required for general purpose
computation. For instance, if a tag of memory address needs to be set to a value, then a general
purpose register is needed to store the memory address.
The TMC core is responsible for decoding annotations and computing specified tag opera-
tions either in the annotation itself or by using the security policy registers. It is a dedicated
coprocessor for decoding annotations and is pipelined in five stages (Fetch, Decode, Execute,
Memory Access, Write Back). It executes annotations that are detailed in Table 2. This core
can be duplicated in order to deal with multiple security policies or in order to propagate tags
for multiple threads or processes.
3.6 Multi-thread support
To the best of our knowledge, no existing hardcore solutions support multi-threaded applica-
tions. The main issue in existing architectures is how the FPGA can determine which thread
is running on the main CPU. This work proposes to take advantage of the trace generated by
the PTM in order to determine the exact order of the thread execution. The ARM CoreSight
PTM can be configured, providing OS support, to recover the TID (Thread ID) of threads on
each context switch. By filtering the trace with TID, the execution order of threads can be
determined. As the trace itself respects the execution order of each thread [5], the CFG (Con-
trol Flow Graph) of each thread can be determined. In other words, the DIFT coprocessor can
determine, thanks to the context ID feature, the thread executed on the ARM CPU and can
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propagate tags for the corresponding information flows. As each thread requires a dedicated
TMC unit, the number of threads supported by the proposed architecture is limited by the
number of TMC units that can be implemented in FPGA.
3.7 Software requirements
All existing off-core approaches require software modifications. However, existing works do not
provide enough information to easily reproduce their work. Therefore, in this subsection, all
proposed software modifications are explained in order to make this work reproducible.
3.7.1 Instrumentation
The DIFT coprocessor can reconstruct the program execution path by creating a CFG using
the decoded trace. However, it has no information on what happens inside each CFG basic
block. The output of the static analysis, as done in [5], states how to propagate tags for each
CPU instruction. However, for memory instructions, the static analysis cannot compute the
memory addresses that are only known at runtime.
0x10168:
0x1016c:
0x10170:
0x10174:
0x10178:
0x1017c:
------------
0x10180:
0x10184:
0x10188:
0x1018c:
movw r0, #0x913c
movt r0, #2
str  r0, [sp, #4]
ldr  r1, [r2], #4
cmp  r3, #6
bxls lr
-----------------------------
movw r3, #0
movt r3, #0
cmp  r3, #0
bxeq lr
B
as
ic
 b
lo
ck
 1
B
as
ic
 b
lo
ck
 2
Application code
(a) Original application
0x10168:
0x1016c:
0x10170:
0x10174:
0x10178:
0x1017c:
0x10180:
0x10184:
------------
0x10188:
0x1018c:
0x10190:
0x10194:
movw r0, #0x913c
movt r0, #2
str  sp, [r9]
str  r0, [sp, #4]
str  r2, [r9]
ldr  r1, [r2], #4
cmp  r3, #6
bxls lr
-----------------------------
movw r3, #0
movt r3, #0
cmp  r3, #0
bxeq lr
B
as
ic
 b
lo
ck
 1
B
as
ic
 b
lo
ck
 2
(b) Instrumented application
Figure 4: Binary instrumentation using modified LLVM
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4. Figure 4a shows the original application code. The
starting address of basic blocks 1 and 2 (underlined addresses) are recovered from the decoded
trace. For memory instructions (in bold in Figure 4a) such as ldr and str at addresses 0x10170
and 0x10174 of the original application, the value of registers (sp and r2) cannot be computed
from static analysis.
This information is needed by the DIFT coprocessor to propagate tags from a register to a
memory address (in case of a store operation) or from a memory address to a register (in case
of a load operation). In this work, this information is obtained by instrumenting the original
application binary. The instrumented application is shown in Figure 4b. Before each memory
instruction, another instruction is added (store instructions at addresses 0x10170 and 0x10178
of Figure 4b) that sends the missing register value to the memory address contained by r9.
The r9 register has been reserved and is not used by the application. It contains the virtual
address associated with the physical address of instrumentation IP (shown in Figure 1) such
that any store to r9 results in a write to the instrumentation IP.
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3.7.2 Kernel support
Existing hardware DIFT approaches only handle tags associated to RAM and registers. How-
ever, they do not take into account information stored on mass storage, i.e. tags associated to
files. This feature is important to handle inter-process communications and data persistence
(after a reboot). Moreover, users are more inclined to specify a policy at the file level rather
than at the memory address or register level. For example, a user can easily identify the files
that are supposed to contain confidential information, such as passwords.
Handling file implies some kernel support. However, the major kernel modifications are
limited to file Input/Output interface. Only a limited number of system calls such as read
or write have to be modified. To handle tags associated to files, we rely on RFBlare [16].
RFBlare is a modified Linux kernel that implements an OS-level DIFT monitor. This monitor
saves tags as file meta-data using file system extended attributes. RFBlare original behavior
consists in propagating tags from files to the process memory whenever a file is read and from
memory to files whenever a file is written. This OS-level approach is coarse-grained since only
one tag is used to abstract the whole memory of a process.
We modify RFBlare to disable the OS-level tag propagation and we only used the feature
that allows associating tags to files. We add some code to enforce a communication between
RFBlare and the DIFT co-processor for each file I/O. For instance, when a read system call
occurs on the ARM core, RFBlare allows retrieving the tag of the file being read, the address
of the buffer where the read data is stored and the number of bytes read. These three values
are sent by the kernel to the FPGA part using RFBlare PS2PL FIFO IP (shown in Figure 1).
Similarly, if a program writes to a file (e.g. write system call), the kernel sends the memory
address of the buffer being written and the size of the buffer. Then, the DIFT coprocessor
fetches the corresponding tag and sends it back to the kernel. RFBlare uses this tag to set
the new tag of the file. All the communication for the write system call use RFBlare PL2PS
FIFO IP (shown in Figure 1). These FIFOs have an AXI-Lite interface to communicate with
the ARM core and a custom FIFO interface to communicate with the TMC.
The main CPU and the DIFT coprocessor has to be synchronized since the main core runs
faster than the DIFT coprocessor on FPGA. In this work, this synchronization is done thanks
to the RFBlare PL2PS and RFBlare PS2PL FIFO mechanisms. As the ARM core and the
DIFT coprocessor runs on different frequencies, the attack might be detected after execution
of the malicious code. However, it will not compromise the system because an attack needs a
system call (for example write) to damage the system. However, each system call waits for
the DIFT coprocessor to finish tag computation before carrying on execution. Therefore, the
synchronization mechanism makes sure that the software attack does not affect the system.
3.7.3 Process mappings
The DIFT coprocessor needs to know memory mappings of the program in order to properly
initialize tag MMU. We modified the ELF binary loader (binfmt elf.c) to send memory
mapping of the process. This way, the DIFT coprocessor starts by initializing TMMU before
any other operation is done.
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4 Case studies
This section shows two use cases where the proposed architecture can outperform existing
works: handling multiple security policies and multi-threaded applications.
This work takes advantage of the internal architecture of the DIFT coprocessor to reuse
developed modules. Figure 5 shows the proposed architecture for analyzing two threads. The
hardware consists of a single dispatcher and two TMC units. This design can also be used to
configure multiple security policies. This work proposes to duplicate some modules of the DIFT
coprocessor to track multiple threads. The other possible solution is to use context switch i.e.
each time the ARM processor switches to another thread, the context of DIFT coprocessor is
saved and the new context is restored. However, this solution will add an important storage
overhead and time overhead because it would require storing the entire content of three register
files and other important CPU registers.
4.1 Multiple security policies
In order to implement multiple security policies of different tag sizes, Dhawan et al. proposed
to modify the internal architecture of the CPU to handle data and tag [4]. Their approach
relies on a 128-bit CPU with 64-bit of data and 64-bit of tag. However, their architecture is
not modular and flexible. For instance, the area and power overhead remain important even if
we consider only a single security policy.
TMC
(thread 2)
Decoded 
trace 
memory
Dispatcher
Tag
memory
DDR
Tag 
annotations
DDR
Tag
memory
DDRBRAM
Annotations
memory
BRAM
TMC
(thread 1)
Annotations
memory
TagRR T1,T2
TagTRI T3,#4
Figure 5: Coprocessor architecture for two threads
The architecture illustrated by Figure 5 can be used for implementing multiple security
policies. In this case, the thread 1 core executes one security policy and the thread 2 core exe-
cutes another security policy. The dispatcher reconstructs the execution path of the application
and stores annotations in both annotations memories. Then, each TMC unit propagates tags
according to its own security policy. If a violation occurs in one of the TMC units, an interrupt
is sent to the ARM core to stop execution.
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This approach is modular since we can adapt the number of TMC units to the number of
policies to verify in parallel.
4.2 Multiple threads
Real-world applications use multiple threads in order to speed up execution. However, existing
DIFT mechanisms are not able to track multiple threads because the interface between the main
processor and the DIFT coprocessor does not export information that allows determining the
thread being executed on the CPU. This approach exploits CoreSight components to extract
the context ID, which comprises the TID (Thread ID) and the ASID (Application-Specific ID).
Single core If two threads are considered and both run on the same CPU core, the context
ID field, retrieved by decoding the PTM trace, allows to determine which thread is currently
being executed. Figure 6 shows the format of decoded traces in memory. The trace contains
I-sync packet (in green) which contains 4 bytes of context-ID (underlined). It can be noticed
that the trace contains the same ASID value (42) and two different TID values (4d2 and 4d3)
corresponding to each thread.
Decoded trace
00010574
00010428
00010584
000103c8
00010598
000103f8
00010574
00010428
00010584
00 00 00 00 00 80 08 74  05 01 00 21 42 d2 04 00
95 04 08 84 05 01 00 21 42 d2 04 00 e5 03 08 98
05 01 00 21 42 d2 04 00  fd 03 08 74 05 01 00 21
42 d3 04 00 95 04 08 84 05 01 00 21 42 d3 04 00
Trace
A-sync I-sync Branch address packet
Context ID
0004d2 42
0004d2 42
0004d2 42
0004d2 42
0004d2 42
0004d2 42
0004d3 42
0004d3 42
0004d3 42
Stored address
 00010574
 00010428
 00010584
 000103c8
 00010598
 000103f8
 00010575
 00010429
 00010585
Figure 6: Decoded trace for multiple threads
The PFT decoder computes the branch address where the ARM core has jumped. These
addresses are 4-byte aligned (in ARM state which is the only state allowed to be used during
compilation) which means that two bits (0 and 1) are always equal to 0.
The PFT decoder also recovers the context ID field and uses these unused two bits to specify
whether the decoded trace is generated by the first thread or the second thread. Figure 6 shows
that for the second thread, the stored addresses in decoded trace memory are not 4-bit aligned
due to the storage of context ID in last two bits. The value of the context ID still needs to be
stored in separate registers so that if an attack is detected, the interrupt routine gets the TID
of the program in order to kill the process in charge of generating unauthorized behavior.
Multi-core system If two threads are launched on two different CPUs, the same architec-
ture can be used to propagate tags. However, the trace configuration and the PFT decoder
needs to be adapted. In this experiment, we only monitor a single ARM Cortex-A9 core. If the
second core is to be considered, the second PTM needs to be configured as well to trace the
program. In terms of configuration, when both PTMs are enabled, each PTM needs to insert
a trace ID packet so that the funnel [17] can merge traces onto a single bus.
Furthermore, trace sinks (TPIU or ETB) must enable formatting to differentiate trace from
different sources. Therefore, the PFT decoder should be adapted in order to consider formatted
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data instead of raw data considered in this work. The rest of the architecture remains the same
as it is similar to multiple threads on a single core case. For multi-core case, a tracing overhead
will appear due to trace formatting that adds low overhead of 6% [18] and an overhead of one
byte every time the trace bus switches between trace sources.
5 Implementation Results
Xilinx tools 2017.1 are used on a Xilinx Zedboard with a Z-7020 SoC (dual-core Cortex-A9
running at 667 MHz and an Artix-7 FPGA) to implement the architecture shown in Figure
1. The Clang compiler has been used with customized LLVM pass to get the binary and
annotations (instructions for TMC). The evaluation described in this section has the following
goals:
• Evaluate feasibility of proposed architecture.
• Evaluate the cost of software modifications (execution time overhead and memory foot-
print).
• Compare efficiency with related works.
5.1 Area results
Table 3 shows the area overhead of this work. Most of the FPGA area is filled by AXI inter-
connect (5.14%), dispatcher (4.18 %) and TMC (3.45%).
The overall design takes 20.4% of the FPGA area. If two security policies are required at
the same time, the design would be modified as shown in Figure 5. The overall design, in case
of two security policies, would take additional 4095 slice LUTs, 9074 slice registers (i.e. 8%
additional FPGA logic) and 6 BRAM tiles. In other words, the proposed design can run more
than 8 security policies or protect more than 8 processes at the same time.
Table 3: Post-synthesis area results on Xilinx Zynq Z-7020
IP Name Slice LUTs (in %) Slice Registers (in %) BRAM Tile
Dispatcher 2223 (4.18%) 1867 (1.75%) 3
TMC 1837 (3.45%) 2581 (2.43%) 6
PFT Decoder 121 (0.23%) 231 (0.22%) 0
Instrumentation 676 (1.27%) 2108 (1.98%) 0
Blare PS2PL 662 (1.24%) 2106 (1.98%) 0
Blare PL2PS 62 (0.12%) 56 (0.05 %) 0
Decoded trace memory 0 0 2
AXI Master 858 (1.61%) 2223 (2.09 %) 0
TMMU 295 (0.55%) 112(0.10 %) 3
AXI Interconnect 2733 (5.14%) 2495 (2.34 %) 0
Miscellaneous 1381 (2.6%) 2160 (2.03%) 0
Total Design 10848 (20.39%) 15939 (14.98%) 14 (10%)
Total Available 53200 106400 140
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5.2 Time overhead analysis
CoreSight components do not add any execution time overhead [5]. Even though this work uses
a different configuration of CoreSight components since the context ID tracing is enabled, Core-
Sight components still do not add any noticeable execution time overhead. The static analysis
does not add time overhead because it is performed offline, during compilation. Therefore, the
timing overhead of the proposed approach is only due to instrumentation. The overhead of
instrumentation is analyzed by measuring instrumented application execution time normalized
to the original application (non-instrumented) running time. Execution times are measured
using a set of custom applications, such as FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) and CRC (Cyclic Re-
dundancy Check) computations, on the Linux kernel 4.9, patched with CoreSight TPIU driver,
using the Linux perf command.
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Figure 7: Average execution time overhead for custom benchmark
Figure 7 shows the average normalized execution time overhead for instrumented applica-
tion binaries. The related work implementation strategy is detailed in [3]. Two instrumentation
strategies (strategy 1 and 2) are adapted from [5]. However, the difference between their pro-
posed strategies and this work resides in static analysis, instrumentation and hardware modules.
All information flows are considered in this work unlike [5]. Library code is instrumented un-
like [5] and different configuration of Coresight components is used which changes the design
of hardware modules such as PFT decoder.
Figure 7 shows that if related work strategy as in [3] is used, the instrumentation overhead,
on average, is 12.79 times higher than the original execution time. The instrumentation strategy
1, in which all memory instructions are instrumented, adds significant execution time overhead
(on average 10.43 times higher than the original execution time). The instrumentation overhead
is high for applications that require more memory operations (such as lu and matrix). However,
if only register-relative (other than PC, SP, and FP) memory instructions are instrumented, as
in strategy 2, the average communication time overhead is reduced by a factor 3.8 to achieve
3.35 times higher execution time on average. The three main reasons why this overhead remains
high are: this work targets hardcore CPU which is not the case in most existing works such
as in [11, 3, 1, 4], the static analysis considers all information flows rather than function level
information flows as in [3, 5] and it also instruments library code used by the applications unlike
[5].
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5.3 Memory Footprint
Figure 8 shows the memory space overhead of custom benchmark applications using both
strategies.
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Figure 8: Memory footprint of custom benchmark
Binaries are statically compiled i.e. all the code executed by the application is inside the
code section of the binary. Therefore, results obtained here take into account all modifications
of user code and the library code. The instrumentation strategy 1 adds in average 10% of
memory space overhead and instrumentation strategy 2 adds in average only 3% of memory
space overhead.
5.4 Comparison with related works
Table 4 shows the comparison of an off-core approach like this work with previous off-core
approaches. Comparison of this work with in-core solutions is not done because they are not
hardcore portable and are very invasive contrary to the off-core solution used in this work.
Compared to [5], this work has higher area overhead because it provides support for FP and
multi-threaded software that requires additional modules in the FPGA area. Furthermore, the
power overhead of this work is similar to [5] because this work does not use any DSPs unlike the
coprocessor used in [5] which is a MicroBlaze with DSP units that are more power consuming
than normal FPGA logic. The maximum frequency achievable is comparable to existing works.
The most important difference resides in communication time overhead. It may appear that
this overhead is higher than values reported in related works.
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Table 4: Performance comparison with previous off-core approaches
Approaches Kannan [2] Deng [11] Heo [3]
Heo [3]
adapted
Wahab [5] This work
Area overhead 6.4% 14.8% 14.47% N/A 0.47% 0.95 %
Power overhead N/A 6.3% 24% N/A 16% 16.2%
Max frequency N/A 256 MHz N/A N/A 250 MHz 250 MHz
Communication
time overhead
N/A N/A 60% 1280% 5.4% 335%
Hardcore
portability
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main CPU Softcore Softcore Softcore Hardcore Hardcore Hardcore
Library
instrumentation
N/A N/A partial Yes No Yes
All
information flows
No No No Yes No Yes
FP support No No No No No Yes
Multi-threaded
support
No No No No No Yes
The fifth column, Heo [3] adapted, shows that if the proposed instrumentation strategy in
related work [3] is adapted with the same static analysis and information flows constraints as
in this work, then the communication time overhead obtained on Zynq architecture reaches
1280%. However, the proposed solution in this work can reduce this overhead to 335% by
a factor 1280
335
= 3.8. The best communication time overhead reported in existing works is
5.4 % ([5]) but their proposed solution lacks support for all information flows and library
instrumentation. Furthermore, the reported value is an estimation based on the number of
instrumented instructions whereas the value reported in this work is obtained on the Zedboard
platform and the time is measured using perf tool on Linux kernel v4.9. It is very important to
consider all information flows and instrument libraries because it allows detecting an important
range of attacks unlike most existing works. For instance, a simple attack on existing works
could be to add a wrapper around library function and use Linux kernel dynamic LD PRELOAD
feature to avoid detection of any malicious library code. However, this work is able to detect
the execution of malicious library code as its tracking is not ignored as in most existing works.
This work provides support for floating point (through additional instructions and additional
register file) and multi-threaded software thanks to context ID feature of the CoreSight PTM
as described in section 4: support for these features is missing in related works.
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6 Conclusion
This work is the first work providing support and flexibility to implement multiple security
policies which can either be specified at run-time or compile-time. It provides features missing
in related works: protection of floating point code and multi-threaded software. Both features
are essential in protecting real-world applications. This work takes advantage of CoreSight
components along with LLVM modifications to implement information flow security policies.
The communication time overhead is reduced to more than 380% if compared to existing
work strategy [3]. Area results show interesting perspectives in terms of implementing multiple
security policies and protecting multiple processes. For instance, protecting two threads requires
another TMC unit which adds an additional area overhead of 8%. As this work deals with multi-
threaded applications that do not share memory, the next step will be to include support for
threads that share memory. Another improvement would be adding support for more than 8
threads by making context switches on each TMC unit.
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